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Abstract
This paper extends the class of stochastic AK growth models with a closed-form
solution to the case where there are two capital goods in the model. To be precise,
we consider the Uzawa-Lucas model of endogenous growth with human and physical
capital. The extension holds, even if an external effect in the use of human capital
in goods production occurs. Using the “guess and verify” method, we determine
the value function of the social planner in the centralized economy and the value
function of the representative agent in the decentralized case. We show that the
introduction of income taxes on wages and of a subsidy on physical capital earnings
is able to help the decentralized economy in reaching the social optimum, while
keeping the policy maker’s budget balanced. Then the time series implications of
the model’s solution are derived. In Appendix to the paper the uniqueness of the
value functions is proved by using an alternative method.
Key words: closed-form solution, value function, saddle path stability, endogenous
growth
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1
1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present the value function of a stochastic version of the Uzawa (1965)
and Lucas (1988) model of endogenous growth in discrete time. The externality of
human capital in goods production inherent to the model causes a difference between
the social planner’s solution and the market outcome. We pay attention to this fact
by treating both cases separately and by presenting both the social planner’s and the
representative agent’s value function. The chapter generalizes the results of Bethmann
(2002) where a deterministic version of this model was examined. Furthermore, we show
that the inefficiency of the decentralized economy can be overcome by introducing taxes
and subsidies on factor compensations.
The main feature of the Uzawa-Lucas model is the fact that the agents have to allo-
cate their human capital between two production sectors. On the one hand, there is a
goods sector where a single good usable for consumption and physical capital investment
is produced. This sector exhibits a production technology that uses human and physical
capital. On the other hand, there is a schooling sector where agents augment their stock
of human capital. Here, human capital is the only input factor. In short, agents have
to “learn or to do” (Chamley, 1993). In his seminal paper, Lucas (1988) argues that
the economy’s average level of human capital contributes to total factor productivity in
goods production. In a decentralized economy the individual’s accumulation of human
capital has no appreciable influence on this average level and agents are only compen-
sated for their respective factor supplies. This incentive structure leads to non-efficient
equilibria. Since agents are not able to coordinate their actions, their discounted utility
could be higher without making a single agent worse off. As a result, the solution for the
centralized economy deviates from that of the decentralized case.
The theoretical model considered here differs from that studied by Lucas (1988) in
two ways. First, there is our choice of the utility function. We assume logarithmic
preferences which imply that the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal
to one. This assumption reduces the number of parameters by one and simplifies the
calculations. Second, we assume discrete time where the two capital stocks depreciate
fully at the end of the period. This way the closed-form solution of the stochastic one
sector growth model with logarithmic preferences and full depreciation of physical capital
(cf. McCallum, 1989) is extended to the case with two capital goods.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
presents the value function in closed form as the solution to the social planner’s dynamic
optimization problem (DOP). In Section 4 we present the value function of the represen-
tative agent. Section 5 shows that the solutions are saddle path stable and determines
their time-series implications. Section 6 summarizes our results and concludes. Appen-
dix proves the uniqueness of the value functions found in the third and fourth section by
using an alternative method.
2 The model
We consider a closed economy populated by an infinite number of homogeneous, infinitely-
lived agents. The representative agent enters every period t with predetermined endow-
ments of human and physical capital, ht and kt, respectively. Furthermore, there are
two sectors in the economy. Firms produce a single homogeneous good and a schooling
sector provides educational services.
2
2.1 The household
The population is assumed to be constant and normalized to one. The representative
agent has logarithmic preferences over sequences of consumption:
U (c0, c1, ..) = Et
[
∞∑
t=0
βt ln (ct)
]
, (1)
where ct is the level of consumption in period t ∈ N0 and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective
discount factor. Expectations are formed over the sequence of shocks {εt}
∞
t=0 entering
goods production. The logarithmic utility function implies that the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution is equal to one. In each period, agents have a fixed endowment
of time, which is normalized to one unit. The variable ut denotes the fraction of time
allocated to goods production in period t. Furthermore, as agents do not benefit from
leisure, the whole time budget is allocated to the two production sectors. The fraction
1− ut of time is spent in the schooling sector. Note that in any solution the condition
ut ∈ [0, 1] (2)
has to be fulfilled. The variables ct and ut are the two control variables of the agent.
When maximizing her discounted stream of utility, the agent has to pay attention to the
following budget constraint:
τrrtkt + τwwtutht = ct + kt+1, ∀t ∈ N0, k0 > 0, (3)
where kt is the agent’s physical capital stock in period t. The terms τrrtkt and τwwtutht
are, respectively, the net returns on physical capital and work effort after taxation. We
assume that both parameters τr and τw are positive. If the parameter τr is smaller than
1, we have a tax on physical capital, if it is larger than 1, we have a subsidy. The same
is true for the parameter τw. If τw < 1, work effort is taxed, if τw > 1, work effort is
subsidized. Hence, the rates of taxation are given by τr−1 and τw−1, respectively. The
above constraint implies full depreciation of physical capital. The variables rt and wt are
market-clearing factor prices. Prices and tax rates are endogenous to the model. The
former via the market clearing mechanism and the latter via the government’s balanced
budget condition. Despite this fact, prices and tax rates are taken as given by the
representative agent. The left-hand side describes her income derived from physical
capital plus the income stemming from effective work, which is determined by the worker’s
level of human capital ht multiplied by the fraction of time spent in the goods sector in
period t, i.e. htut. We assume that the initial values k0 and h0 are strictly positive. On
the right-hand side, the spending of the agent’s earnings appears, which she can either
consume or invest. Another constraint the agent has to keep in mind is the evolution of
her stock of human capital when allocating 1− ut to the schooling sector.
2.2 The schooling sector
The creation of human capital is determined by a linear technology in human capital
only:
ht+1 = B (1− ut)ht, ∀t ∈ N0, h0 > 0, (4)
where we assume that B is positive1. If we set ut in equation (4) equal to zero, we get
the potential stock of next period’s human capital. If we set ut equal to one, tomorrow’s
1The case when B equals 0 corresponds to the neoclassical growth model.
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stock of human capital is equal to zero. The schooling technology implies that the
potential marginal and average product of human capital coincide and are equal to B,
whereas the realized marginal and average products are equal to B (1− ut). Note that
the depreciation rate of human capital is 100 percent per period.
2.3 The goods sector
We assume an infinitely large number of profit-maximizing firms producing a single good.
They are using a Cobb-Douglas technology in physical capital kt and effective work htut.
Furthermore, the average skill of workers ha,t has a positive influence on total factor
productivity. Hence, output yt is determined by:
yt = Atk
α
t (utht)
1−α
hγa,t. (5)
The parameter α is the output elasticity of physical capital and we assume α ∈ (0, 1).
The parameter γ is non-negative and measures the degree of the external effect of human
capital. If we set ut equal to one, we get the potential output in the goods sector. The
homogeneity of the agents implies that:
ha,t = ht, ∀t ∈ N0. (6)
The state variable At denotes total factor productivity. Throughout this chapter, we
assume that lnAt follows a first-order autoregressive process, i.e.:
lnAt+1 = ρ lnAt + εt+1, ∀t ∈ N0 and ε ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
. (7)
This assumption is a generalization of Bethmann (2002), where A was taken as fixed.
The firm has to rent physical and human capital on perfectly competitive factor markets.
In the decentralized economy, the representative firm’s profit Π in period t is given by:
Π (kt, ht;At, ha,t) = Atk
α
t (utht)
1−α
hγa,t − rtkt − wtutht,
where the semicolon indicates that the whole paths of ha,t and At are treated as exogenous
by the representative firm. The first-order necessary conditions for the profit-maximizing
factor demands are:
rt ≡
∂yt
∂kt
= αyt
kt
and wt ≡
∂yt
∂(utht)
= (1−α)yt
utht
. (8)
These market-clearing factor prices ensure that the zero-profit condition holds. Inserting
the prices into the agent’s budget constraint (3) yields:
τrαyt + τw(1− α)yt = ct + kt+1, ∀t ∈ N0. (9)
2.4 The state sector in the decentralized economy
In each period t, we require the state’s budget to be balanced. Therefore:
(τr − 1) rtkt = (1− τw)wtutht (10)
must hold for all t ∈ N0. This means that if we consider a tax on physical capital returns,
we are subsidizing work effort at the same time and vice versa. This remark ends the
presentation of the model. In Section 3, we solve the centralized version of this model.
4
3 The centralized solution of the model
In the centralized economy, the social planner internalizes the contribution of the econ-
omy’s average level of human capital to goods production. That is, the planner is able to
reach the efficient allocation of resources without the instrument of taxation. Therefore,
we assume τr=τw=1 throughout this section.
The central planner internalizes the social returns of human capital when choosing his
optimal controls. This means that he exploits the symmetry condition stated in equation
(6) and writes his DOP as follows:
U = sup
{ct,ut}
∞
t=0
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt ln ct
]
,
with respect to the state dynamics
kt+1 = Ak
α
t u
1−α
t h
1−α+γ
t − ct, ∀ t ∈ N0, (11)
ht+1 = B (1− ut)ht, ∀ t ∈ N0, (12)
lnAt+1 = ρ lnAt + εt+1, ∀ t ∈ N0, (13)
kt ≥ 0 and ht ≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ N0.
Since the social planner uses the symmetry from (6), he has simply dropped the index
a. Furthermore, the initial values k0, h0, and A0 > 0 are assumed to be given and the
social planner has to ensure that
ct > 0 and 0 ≤ ut ≤ 1
hold for all t ∈ N0. He defines the value function as the solution to his optimization
problem from time t onwards:
V (kt, ht, At) ≡ sup
{cs,us}
∞
s=t
Et
[
∞∑
s=t
βs−t ln cs
]
s.t. (11), (12), and (13).
The Bellman equation associated with the planner’s DOP is given by:
V (kt, ht, At) = sup
ct,ut
{ln ct + βEt [V (kt+1, ht+1, At+1)]} . (14)
The first-order necessary conditions for the optimal consumption choice and the optimal
allocation of human capital between the two sectors are given by:
ct :
1
c∗t
= βEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
]
, (15)
ut : u
∗
t =
(
Et
h
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
i
(1−α)At
Et
h
∂Vt+1
∂ht+1
i
B
) 1
α
kt
h
α−γ
α
t
, (16)
where Vt stands for V (kt, ht, At) and the asterisk denotes optimality. Equation (15)
describes the behavior along the optimal consumption path. When shifting a marginal
unit of today’s output from consumption to investment, today’s marginal change in
utility should equal the expected discounted marginal change of wealth with respect to
tomorrow’s capital stock. Equation (16) states that the weighted expected marginal
change of wealth with respect to physical capital equals the weighted expected marginal
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change of wealth with respect to human capital. The first weight is the marginal product
of human capital in goods production, given a certain choice of ut. The second weight is
the potential marginal product of human capital when the remaining fraction of human
capital is allocated to the educational sector.
We now turn to the Euler Equations. The envelope property with respect to physical
capital is straightforward. Together with the above first-order necessary conditions (15)
and (16), it gives rise to the following Euler equation in consumption:
1
ct
= βEt
[
1
ct+1
αyt+1
kt+1
]
. (17)
This is the Lucas asset pricing equation (cf. Lucas, 1978) with the constant of relative
risk aversion being equal to one. Along the optimal consumption path, marginal utility
of consumption in time t must be equal to the discounted expected marginal utility from
the return on investment in the next period. The envelope condition for the stock of
human capital is given by:
∂Vt
∂ht
= βEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂ht+1
B(1−α+γut)
1−α
]
. (18)
The last term on the right-hand side, γut, indicates that the expected marginal social
gain of exploiting the external effect in goods production has an impact on the evolution
of the shadow price of human capital. To be precise, today’s shadow price of human
capital is positively influenced by the degree of the external effect of human capital in
goods production. This is the mechanism by which the external effect enters the second
Euler equation along the optimal allocation of human capital between the two sectors:
ut =

Eth 1ct+1 αyt+1kt+1 i(1−α)At
Et

(1−α+γut+1)yt+1
ct+1ht+1ut+1

B


1
α
kt
h
α−γ
α
t
. (19)
The transversality conditions with respect to the two capital stocks that establish the
sufficiency of the two Euler equations (17) and (19) are given by:
lim
T→∞
βTE0
[
αyT
cT kT
kT
]
= 0 and lim
T→∞
βTE0
[
(1−α+γuT )yT
cTuThT
hT
]
= 0. (20)
The conditions (20) assert that the intertemporal budget constraints are met by the
planner’s decisions. Since the social planner exploits the external effect of human capital,
the derivative of the production function with respect to human capital looks different
from that in a decentralized economy below. This derivative is the sum of the private
marginal return from utht and the marginal social gain of the average stock of human
capital ht.
Using the guess and verify method, it is possible to generalize Robinson Crusoe’s
value function V and the planer’s value function found in Bethmann (2002) as follows:
V = θ + θB lnB + θA lnAt + θk ln kt + θh lnht, (21)
where the θi’s, with i ∈ {k, h,B,A}, are defined as follows
2:
θB :=
(1−α+γ)β
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
, θA :=
1
(1−ρβ)(1−αβ) , θk :=
α
1−αβ , θh :=
1−α+γ
(1−αβ)(1−β) .
2The constant term is given by: θ :=
ln[1−αβ]
1−β
+
(1−α) ln[1−β]
(1−β)(1−αβ)
+ αβ lnα
(1−β)(1−αβ)
+
(1−αβ+γ) ln β
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
+
(1−α) ln[1−α]
(1−αβ)(1−β)
+
β(1−α+γ) ln[1−α+γ]
(1−αβ)(1−β)2
−
(1−α+βγ) ln[1−α+βγ]
(1−αβ)(1−β)2
.
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The function V implies the following controls along the welfare-maximizing consumption
and human capital allocation paths:
ct = (1− αβ) yt and ut =
(1−α)(1−β)
1−α+βγ := u . (22)
Note that 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 is satisfied even in the strict sense. Furthermore, the allocation of
human capital is constant regardless of the respective endowments of human and physical
capital. The central planner simply devotes a constant share of goods production to
consumption. Surely, findings (22) must also hold in period T such that it is easy to
see that the Euler equations (17) and (19) and the transversality conditions (20) are
satisfied. This remark closes the discussion of the centralized case. In the next section
we turn to the decentralized economy.
4 The decentralized solution of the model
In the decentralized case, we assume a representative agent with rational behavior. The
agent knows that her stock of human capital equals the average level of human capital
in the economy. Furthermore, she knows that the external effects of human capital
in goods production, captured by the term hγa,t, may increase her and all the other
agents’ wealth. But here, in the decentralized case, the market mechanism prevents
a coordination of agents’ actions. This can be understood as a Nash game producing
the prisoner’s dilemma. For this reason, we introduce a government that taxes and
subsidizes the respective factor compensations. In the first subsection we write down the
representative agent’s optimization problem. Then, the second subsection characterizes
the agent’s optimal behavior. Finally, the third subsection determines the government’s
optimal taxation policy.
4.1 The representative agent’s optimization problem
Although the external effect of the economy’s average human capital stock in period t
may be not exploited, the whole path of ha,t is predictable and is therefore treated as
given by the agents. The representative agent’s DOP is given by:
U = sup
{ct,ut}
∞
t=0
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt ln ct
]
,
with respect to the state dynamics
kt+1 = τrrtkt + τwwtutht − ct, ∀ t ∈ N0, (23)
ht+1 = B (1− ut)ht, ∀ t ∈ N0, (24)
ha,t+1 = B (1− ua,t)ha,t, ∀ t ∈ N0, (25)
lnAt+1 = ρ lnAt + εt+1, ∀ t ∈ N0, (26)
kt ≥ 0 and ht ≥ 0, ∀ t ∈ N0.
The variable ua stands for the average human capital allocation in the decentralized
economy, the value of which cannot be influenced by the representative agent.
We start the analysis of the decentralized economy with the definition of the value
function as the solution to the representative agent’s problem:
V (kt, ht;At, ha,t) ≡ sup
{cs,us}
∞
s=t
Et
[
∞∑
s=t
βs-t ln cs
]
s.t. (2) - (8).
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Note that the value function of the representative agent is restricted to a given path of
ha,t. The corresponding Bellman equation is given by:
V (kt, ht;At, ha,t) ≡ sup
ct,ut
{ln ct + βEt [V (kt+1, ht+1;At+1, ha,t+1)]} . (27)
Taking the derivatives with respect to the two controls and inserting the market-clearing
factor prices (8) gives us the following first-order necessary conditions:
ct :
1
c∗t
= βEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
]
, (28)
ut : u
∗
t =
(
Et
h
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
i
(1−α)τwAt
Et
h
∂Vt+1
∂ht+1
i
B
) 1
α
kth
γ
α
a,t
ht
, (29)
where Vt+1 is a shortcut for V (kt+1, ht+1;At+1, ha,t+1). Equation (28) is very standard
and characterizes the effect of shifting one unit of today’s output from consumption
to investment. Today’s marginal change in utility should equal the expected discounted
marginal change in tomorrow’s wealth with respect to tomorrow’s capital stock. Equation
(29) considers the shifting of a marginal unit of human capital from the goods production
sector to the schooling sector, or vice versa. The condition states that the marginal
change in goods production due to this shifting, weighted by the expected shadow price
of physical capital, should equal the marginal change in the schooling sector weighted by
the expected shadow price of human capital. Using the envelope property of the optimal
decision rules:
c∗t = c (kt, ht;At, ha,t) and u
∗
t = u (kt, ht;At, ha,t) , (30)
leads us to the following envelope conditions:
∂Vt
∂kt
= βEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
]
ατryt
kt
, and ∂Vt
∂ht
= βEt
[
∂Vt+1
∂ht+1
]
B.
These conditions together with the above first-order necessary conditions along the op-
timal consumption path (28) and for the optimal allocation of human capital (29) imply
the following Euler equations:
1
ct
= βEt
[
1
ct+1
τrαyt+1
kt+1
]
, (31)
ut =
(
Et
h
1
ct+1
ατryt+1
kt+1
i
Et
h
1
ct+1
yt+1
ut+1ht+1
i
At
B
) 1
α
kth
γ
α
a,t
ht
. (32)
The two Euler equations (31) and (32) are necessary for a policy to attain the optimum.
Together with the following transversality conditions they are also sufficient:
lim
T→∞
βTEt
[
1
cT
τrαyT
kT
kT
]
= 0 and lim
T→∞
βTEt
[
1
cT
τw(1−α)yT
uThT
hT
]
= 0 (33)
Note that the first fraction in both conditions is the derivative of the utility function and
the second fraction is the derivative of the goods sector production function with respect
to the inputs of physical and human capital. To be more precise, the last derivative is
taken with respect to the fraction of human capital that is allocated to the goods sector,
i.e. utht. These derivatives are multiplied by the respective state variable. The transver-
sality conditions tell us that the expected discounted marginal utility of an additional
unit of the capital stocks in the “last period” is equal to zero. These requirements rule
out that the agent plays Ponzi games.
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4.2 The representative agent’s optimal decisions
Again, it is easy to check that a generalized version of Robinson Crusoe’s value function
and of the representative agent’s value function V found in Bethmann (2002) satisfies
the Bellman equation (27) and the first order necessary conditions (28) and (29) simul-
taneously:
V (kt, ht;ha,t) = ϕ+ ϕB lnB + ϕA lnAt + ϕk ln kt + ϕh lnht + ϕha lnha,t, (34)
where the ϕi’s, with i ∈ {k, h, ha, B,A}, are defined as follows
3:
ϕk :=
α
1−αβ , ϕh :=
1−α
(1−β)(1−αβ) , ϕha :=
γ
(1−β)(1−αβ) ,
ϕB :=
(1−α+γ)β
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
, ϕA :=
1
(1−ρβ)(1−αβ) .
The optimal controls implied by V are the following:
ct = (1− αβ) yt and ut =
τw(1−β)
β+τw(1−β)
. (35)
If the government sets τw and τr equal to 1, these results correspond exactly to the
deterministic case examined in Bethmann (2002). V implies a constant allocation of
human capital between the two production sectors, i.e. the evolution of the average
stock of human capital ha does not enter the first-order necessary condition for ut in (35).
Hence, there is no linkage between the representative agent’s decision and the economy-
wide average decision. Therefore the solution strategy of determining the evolution of the
agent’s stock of capital and then exploiting the symmetry condition (6) is equivalent to
the strategy of finding a fixed point where the representative agent’s policy rules coincide
with the economy-wide average decisions. Hence, the equation:
ha,t+1 = B
β
β+τw(1−β)
ha,t.
determines the path of the economy-wide average level of human capital in the decen-
tralized economy. Together with the agent’s optimal controls, this result implies that the
Euler equations (31) and (32) and the transversality conditions (33) are met.
4.3 The government’s optimal policy
The government wants to reach the social planner’s solution by taxing, respectively
subsidizing the agent’s factor compensations. Note that the absence of τr in the first order
conditions (35) implies that the planner’s solution can be reached by simply requiring ut
to be socially optimal. On the other hand, assumption (10) requires that the state has
to ensure that its budget is balanced in each period. These two requirements lead us to
the following two conditions:
(1−α)(1−β)
1−α+βγ =
τw(1−β)
β+τw(1−β)
and (τr − 1)α = (1− τw) (1− α) . (36)
This implies the following optimal values of τw and τr:
τw =
1−α
1−α+γ and τr =
α−α2+γ
(1−α+γ)α .
3The constant is given by: ϕ ≡
ln[1−αβ]
1−β
+
(1−α) ln[1−β]
(1−β)(1−αβ)
+ αβ lnα
(1−β)(1−αβ)
+
(1−αβ+γ)β ln β
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
+
(1−α) ln[τw ]
(1−αβ)(1−β)
−
(1−α+βγ) ln[β+τw(1−β)]
(1−αβ)(1−β)2
.
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Hence, the compensation of work effort is reduced by the ratio of the output elasticities
of human capital in the decentralized and centralized economy, i.e. by the ratios of
private and social marginal returns of human capital in goods production. These tax
revenues are then distributed to the owners of the physical capital stock. This result is
very intuitive and leads to an increased goods production in the decentralized economy.4
Note that the planner’s and the representative agent’s value functions are identical if we
apply the above condition on τw and use (6).
In the last two sections, we have studied both the centralized as well as the decen-
tralized version of the Uzawa-Lucas Model of Endogenous Growth. We have found the
two value functions and shown that the implied controls satisfy the Euler equations and
the transversality conditions. In the next section, we show that the solutions are saddle
path stable and determine their time-series implications.
5 Stability properties and time series implications of
the solutions
In this section, the aim is twofold. First, we want to determine the stability properties
of the two solutions. Second, we want to characterize the time-series properties. Lucas
(1988) points out that the growth rate of human capital along the balanced growth
path is given by B(1−ubgp). Furthermore, he shows that the growth rates of physical
capital, output, and consumption are 1−α+γ1−α times the growth rate of human capital.
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) use this property in order to introduce transformed
state-like and control-like variables. These new variables remain constant along the
balanced growth path. This stationarity together with the fact that the number of state
variables is reduced by one makes the analysis of growth models much simpler. Benhabib
and Perli (1994) follow this strategy and define the state-like variable xt and the control-
like variable qt. In principle, we apply the same strategy and argue that the DOP
is homogeneous in the initial conditions h0 = ha,0 and k0. However, as in Bethmann
(2002) and Bethmann and Reiß (2003), our consideration leads us to a different definition
of the control-like variable qt
5.
Because of the homogeneity in the initial conditions of the central planner’s DOP, we
define the state-like variable xt and the control-like variable qt as follows:
xt :=
kt
h
1−α+γ
1−α
t
and qt :=
ct
h
1−α+γ
1−α
t
.
Similarly, the representative agent’s DOP is homogeneous in its initial conditions. The
only difference is that we must distinguish between the representative agent’s stock of
human capital h and the economy-wide average stock of human capital ha. Therefore we
redefine the state-like variable xt and the control-like variable qt as:
xt :=
kt
hth
γ
1−α
a,t
and qt :=
ct
hth
γ
1−α
a,t
.
4Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) present an opposite result. They study a two period OLG model with
endogenous growth where lower labor income taxes correspond to higher capital income taxes. Thereby
the young generation is able to generate higher savings which in turn lead to higher growth.
5The first paper studies a discrete time version of the deterministic Uzawa Lucas Model of Endogenous
Growth with full depreciation of human and physical capital while the second refers to continuous time
and no depreciation. In both papers, we apply the same definition of q as we do here. On the other
hand, Benhabib and Perli (1994) use q = c/k.
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The state-like variable can be interpreted as a weighted ratio of the two capital stocks. In
the deterministic model, the state-like variable xt remains constant along the balanced
growth path. Here, we consider a stochastic model such that xt may sometimes be above
or below its balanced growth path where the dynamics stem from the physical capital
stock since our solutions imply that h evolves deterministically both in the centralized as
well as in the decentralized case. In Section 4 we have shown that the government is able
to force agents to make socially optimal decisions, i.e. to internalize the external effects
stemming from the economy-wide average stock of human capital. Therefore this section
focuses on the decentralized case. The representative agent’s solution is fully described
by the policy rules (35) together with the laws of motion for kt, ht, ha,t, and At. Using
our results, the dynamics of total factor productivity, of the state-like variable, and of
the control-like variable are described by the following equations:
lnAt+1 = ρ lnAt + εt+1
xt+1 =
αβu1−α
B
1−α+γ
1−α (1−u)
1−α+γ
1−α
xαt At
qt =
(1−αβ)u1−α
B
1−α+γ
1−α (1−u)
1−α+γ
1−α
xαt At.
Taking logarithms and using small letters with a hat in order to indicate this transfor-
mation, we arrive at:
aˆt+1 = ρaˆt + εt+1,
xˆt+1 = ln
[
αβu1−α
B
1−α+γ
1−α (1−u)
1−α+γ
1−α
]
+ αxˆt + aˆt,
qˆt = ln
[
(1−αβ)u1−α
B
1−α+γ
1−α (1−u)
1−α+γ
1−α
]
+ αxˆt + aˆt.
The law of motion of total factor productivity is a first-order autoregressive process with
stable root ρ:
aˆt =
εt
1−ρL .
The evolution of the logged state-like variable xˆ is described by a stochastic first-order
difference equation with stable root α and stochastic disturbance aˆ. Hence the logged
state-like variable xˆ follows an AR(2) process:
xˆt+1 =
1
1−α ln
[
αβu1−α
B
1−α+γ
1−α (1−u)
1−α+γ
1−α
]
+ εt(1−ρL)(1−αL) ,
where the constant term on the right-hand side is the unconditional mean of the log
state-like variable xˆ. Since the control-like variable qt is non-ambiguously determined by
At and xt, we conclude that the whole system is saddle-path stable. Furthermore, the
control-like variable qt follows an AR(2) process:
qˆt = ln [1− αβ] + lnu+
α
1−α ln
[
αβ
B
1−α+γ
1−α (1−u)
1−α+γ
1−α
]
+ εt−1(1−ρL)(1−αL) .
We conclude that the detrended output sˆt := yˆt− hˆt−
γ
1−α hˆa,t is also AR(2). Note that
B(1−ubgp) in the decentralized case is equal to B
β
β+τw(1−β)
, such that optimal taxation
induces a human capital growth rate of Bβ 1−α+γ1−α+βγ , whereas a laissez-faire policy implies
Bβ, such that the growth rates in the centralized case or in the decentralized case with
optimal taxation are indeed higher than in the decentralized economy with suboptimal or
no taxation. This concludes the discussion of the time-series implications of our solutions.
In the next section we formally prove the uniqueness of the value functions found before.
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6 Summary and concluding remarks
We have proven that the functions (21) and (34) are the value functions of the social
planner and of the representative agent, respectively. We can use these functions and the
first order necessary conditions along the optimal consumption paths in order to find the
optimal level of consumption. The result is the typical consumption rule for the standard
AK model with logarithmic preferences, Cobb-Douglas technology, and full depreciation
of physical capital. It is easy to check that this result does fit the Euler equation in
consumption (31). Similarly, we can use (34) and the first order necessary condition for
the optimal human capital allocation (29). We find that the optimal way to shift human
capital between the two production sectors is to hold ut constant, once we have found
the optimal allocation. Similar to the consumption rule, it can be shown that this policy
rule fulfills the Euler equation (32). Furthermore, the restriction ut ∈ [0, 1] holds. The
transversality conditions in (33) ensure that the policy rules (35) of the representative
agent are necessary and sufficient for a utility maximizing path. In the centralized case,
the optimal stock of human capital employed in the goods sector ut is a little bit smaller
than in the decentralized case without taxation, although ut ∈ [0, 1] still holds. Hence,
the path of human capital in the centralized economy lies above the human capital path
in the decentralized economy given the same initial stocks of capital.
Finally, we have shown that the time series properties of the model are similar to
those of the standard neoclassical growth model when looking at the detrended time
series. This is due to the fact that the optimal human capital allocation is a constant
and thus unaffected by the state variables. As a consequence, the growth rate of human
capital is always equal to B(1 − ubgp). Hence, the introduction of the schooling sector
does not change the dynamics of the model.
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A Appendices
A.1 Finding the value function by iteration
In Sections A.2 and A.3 of this appendix, we will use an iterative method to find the value
functions that attain the suprema of the two DOPs considered in Sections 3 and 4. We
introduce some basic concepts of stochastic dynamic programming from the textbook by
Stokey and Lucas (1989) and finally formulate Theorem 9.12. This verification theorem
states that under certain conditions a solution to the Bellman equation is necessary and
sufficient even in the stochastic unbounded returns case.
Let (X,X ) and (Z,Z) be any measurable spaces, and let (S,S) := (X×Z,X ×Z) be
the product space. The set X is the set of possible values for the vector of endogenous
state variables, Z is the set of possible values for the exogenous shock, and S is the set
of possible states of the system. The evolution of the stochastic shocks is described by a
stationary transition function Q on (Z,Z).
In each period t, the decision-maker chooses the vector of endogenous states in the
subsequent period. The constraints on this choice are described by a correspondence
Γ : X × Z → X; that is, Γ(x, z) is the set of feasible values for next period’s state
variables if the current state is (x, z). Let A be the graph of Γ:
A =
{
(x, y, z) ∈ X ×X × Z : y ∈ Γ(x, z)
}
.
Let F : A 7→ R be the per-period return function. Hence F (x, y, z) gives us the current
period return if the current state is (x, z) and y ∈ Γ(x, z) is chosen as next period’s vector
of endogenous state variables. The constant one-period discount factor is denoted by β
and we assume β ∈ (0, 1). The givens for the problem at hand are (X,X ), (Z,Z), Q, Γ,
F , and β.
In period 0, with the current state (x0, z0) known, the decision maker chooses a value
for x1. In addition, he makes contingency plans for periods t ∈ N. He realizes that the
decision to be carried out in period t depends on the information that will be available
at that time. Thus he chooses a sequence of functions, one for each period t ∈ N. The
t-th function in this sequence specifies a value for xt+1 as a function of the information
that will be available in period t. For t ≥ 1, this information is the sequence of shocks
(z1, z2, .., zt). The decision maker chooses this sequence of functions to maximize the
expected discounted sum of returns, where the expectation is over realizations of shocks.
We define the following product spaces:
(Zt,Zt) = (Z × ..× Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
,Z × ..×Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
),
for all t ∈ N. Furthermore let zt = (z1, .., zt) ∈ Z
t denote a partial history of shocks in
periods 1 through t.
Definition 1. A plan is a value pi0 ∈ X and a sequence of measurable functions pit :
Zt → X, t ∈ N.
Hence, in period t with the partial history of shocks zt, the function pit(z
t) tells us
the value of next period’s states xt+1.
Definition 2. A plan pi is feasible from (x0, z0) ∈ S if
(1a) pi0 ∈ Γ(x0, z0),
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(1b) pit(z
t) ∈ Γ[pit-1(z
t-1), zt].
Let Π(x0, z0) denote the set of plans that are feasible from (x0, z0). This set is
nonempty if the correspondence Γ is nonempty and a certain measurability constraint is
met.
Assumption 1. Γ is nonempty-valued and the graph of Γ is (X × X × Z)-measurable.
In addition, Γ has a measurable selection; that is, there exists a measurable function
h : (X,Z) 7→ X such that h(x, z)∈Γ (x, z) for all (x, z)∈ S.
Under this assumption, the set Π(x0, z0) is nonempty for all (x0, z0) ∈ S.
6 A plan pi
constructed by using the same measurable selection h from Γ in every period t is said to
be stationary or Markov, since the action it prescribes for each period t depends only on
the state [pit-1(z
t-1), zt] in that period. Nonstationary plans can be constructed by using
different measurable selections ht in each period. Let a feasible plan and the transition
function Q on (Z,Z) be given. We want to calculate the total, discounted, expected
returns associated with this plan. Given the initial state (x0, z0) ∈ S, we define the
following probability measures µt(z0, ·) : Z
t 7→ [0, 1]:
µt(z0, Z) =
∫
Z1
..
∫
Zt-1
∫
Zt
Q(zt-1, dzt)Q(zt-2, dzt-1)..Q(z0, dz1), ∀ t ∈ N.
The domain of the per-period return function F is the set A, the graph of Γ. Then we
can define the set A as:
A =
{
C ∈ X × X × Z : C ⊆ A
}
.
Under Assumption 1, A is a σ-algebra. Furthermore, if F is A-measurable, then for any
(x0, z0) ∈ S and any pi ∈ Π(x0, z0),
F [pit-1(z
t-1), pit(z
t), zt] is Z
t-measurable, ∀ t ∈ N.
This rationalizes our next assumption.
Assumption 2. F : A 7→ R is A-measurable, and either (a) or (b) holds.
(a) F ≥ 0 or F ≤ 0
(b) For each (x0, z0) ∈ S and each plan pi ∈ Π,
F [pit-1(z
t-1), pit(z
t), zt] is µ
t-integrable, ∀ t ∈ N,
and the limit
F [x0, pi0, z0] + lim
n→∞
n∑
t=1
∫
Zt
βtF [pit-1(z
t-1), pit(z
t), zt]µ
t(x0, dz
t)
exists (although it may be plus or minus infinity).
Assumption 2 ensures that, for each (x0, z0) ∈ S, we can define the functions un(·, x0, z0) :
Π(x0, z0) 7→ R, n ∈ N0, by:
u0(pi, x0, z0) = F [x0, pi0, z0],
un(pi, x0, z0) = F [x0, pi0, z0] +
n∑
t=1
∫
Zt
βtF [pit-1(z
t-1), pit(z
t), zt]µ
t(x0, dz
t).
6A proof of this result can be found in Lucas and Stokey (1989), page 243.
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The value of un(pi, x0, z0) is the sum of expected discounted returns in periods 0 through
n from plan pi if the initial state is (x0, z0). Assumption 2 also ensures that for each
(x0, z0) ∈ S we can define u(·, x0, z0) : Π(x0, z0) 7→ R¯ to be the limit of the series as the
horizon recedes:
u(pi, x0, z0) = lim
n→∞
un(pi, x0, z0).
Thus u(pi, x0, z0) is the infinite sum of expected discounted returns from the plan pi if
the initial state is (x0, z0). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the function u(·, x, z) is well
defined on the nonempty set Π(x, z), for each (x, z) ∈ S. In this case we can define the
supremum function v∗ : S 7→ R¯ by:
v∗(x, z) = sup
pi∈Π(x,z)
u(pi, x, z).
That is v∗ is the unique function satisfying the following two conditions:
v∗ ≥ u(pi, x, z), all pi ∈ Π(x, z);
v∗ = lim
k 7→∞
u(pik, x, z), for some sequence {pik} in Π(x, z).
In the bounded returns case, a solution v to the functional equation must have the
property that the expected discounted value of the implied policy in the very far future
is equal to zero, that is we exclude for example sustained overinvestment. The difficulty
with the unbounded returns case is that there may be some (x0, z0) ∈ S and pi ∈ Π(x0, z0)
for which the condition:
lim
t→∞
βt
∫
Zt
v[pit-1(z
t-1), zt]µ
t(z0, dz
t) = 0, ∀pi ∈ Π(x0, z0), ∀(x0, z0) ∈ S (37)
does not hold. For each (x0, z0) ∈ S, however, we can define Πˆ(x0, z0) to be the subset
of Π(x0, z0) on which this condition holds. Then define vˆ : S 7→ R by
vˆ(x, z) = sup
pi∈Πˆ(x,z)
u(pi, x, z)
Clearly vˆ ≤ v∗. The following theorem provides sufficient conditions for the two functions
to be equal.
Theorem 3. Let (X,X ), (Z,Z), Q, Γ, F , and β satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Let Π,
Πˆ, u, v∗, and vˆ be as defined above. Suppose v is a measurable function satisfying the
functional equation
v(x, z) = sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
[
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
v(y, z′)Q(z, dz′)
]
,
and that the associated policy correspondence G is nonempty and permits a measurable
selection. For each (x, z) ∈ S, let pi∗(·, x, z) be a plan generated by G from (x, z). Suppose
in addition that
(a) pi∗(·, x, z) ∈ Πˆ(x, z); and
(b) for any (x0, z0) ∈ S and pi ∈ Π(x0, z0), there exists pˆi ∈ Πˆ(x, z) such that u(pˆi, x, z) ≥
u(pi, x, z).
Then v∗(x, z) = vˆ(x, z) = v(x, z) = u(pi∗(·;x, z), x, z), ∀(x, z) ∈ S.
Proof. See Stokey and Lucas (1989), page 274.
In the next sections we will apply this theorem to our model.
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A.2 The centralized economy
The social planner’s optimization problem can be rewritten such that in every period t
the states kt and ht are given and next period’s states kt+1 and ht+1 have to be chosen,
i.e. we want to replace the variables ct and ut. Equation (9) can be solved for ct and
the resulting expression can be substituted into the utility function. Similarly, we solve
equation (4) for utht and insert the result into the production function. In terms of the
state variables, the planner’s maximization problem is now given by:
sup
{kt+1,ht+1}
∞
t=0
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βtF (kt, ht, kt+1, ht+1, At)
]
such that
F (kt, ht, kt+1, ht+1, At) = ln
[
Atk
α
t
(
ht −
ht+1
B
)1−α
hγt − kt+1
]
,
0 < ht+1 < Bht,
0 < kt+1 < Atk
α
t h
1−α+γ
t ,
lnAt+1 = ρ lnAt + εt+1.
Hence, let (ht, kt)
T ∈ X = R2++ and At ∈ Z = R++ with the Borel sets X and Z. Let
β ∈ (0, 1) and let:
Γ(kt, ht, At) =
{
(kt+1, ht+1)
∣∣∣∣Atkαt (ht-ht+1B )1-α hγt -kt+1 ∈ R++; kt+1,ht+1> 0
}
and
F (kt, ht, kt+1, ht+1, At) = ln
[
Atk
α
t
(
ht-
ht+1
B
)1-α
hγt -kt+1
]
,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ [0, α). Let the exogenous shocks be serially correlated with
E[lnAt+1] = ρ lnAt. In order to apply Theorem 3, we want verify that Assumptions 1
and 2 hold; find (v,G) and construct the plan pi∗(·;x, z), for all (x, z) ∈ S, and show that
the hypotheses (a) and (b) hold.
Clearly Assumption 1 holds: Γ(k, h,A) 6= ∅ and there are lots of measurable selections,
for example,
h(ht, kt, At) = (
1
2Bht,
1
2Atk
α
t h
1−α+γ
t ) ∈ Γ(ht, kt, At).
To establish that Assumption 2 holds, note first that the per-period return func-
tion F
[
pi1t-1(A
t-1), pi2t-1(A
t-1), pi1t (A
t), pi2t (A
t), At
]
is µt(A0, ·)-integrable and second that
for any (ht, kt, At) and any pi ∈ Π(ht, kt, At) for all t ∈ N:
lnpi1t-1(A
t-1) < t lnB + lnh0 (38)
lnpi2t-1(A
t-1) <
t−1∑
i=0
αi lnAt-1-i + (1−α+γ)
t−1∑
i=0
αi lnpi1t-2-i(A
t-2-i) + αt ln k0
holds. Using the first inequality (38), we may further simplify the second and finally
arrive at the following condition:7
lnpi2t-1(z
t-1) <
t−1∑
i=0
αi lnAt-1-i +
(
t
1−α +
αt−1
(1−α)2
)
(1−α+ γ) lnB + αt ln k0
+ (1−α+γ)(1−α
t)
1−α lnh0.
7Note, that
Pt
s=0 sα
s = α 1−α
t
(1−α)2
−
αt+1t
1−α
holds.
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Applying the expectations operator with respect to the information set available in period
0 to all At-1-i gives:
E0
[
lnpi2t-1(z
t-1)
]
< ρ
t−αt
ρ−α lnA0 +
(1−α+γ)(1−αt)
1−α lnh0 + α
t ln k0
+
(
t
1−α +
αt−1
(1−α)2
)
(1−α+γ) lnB (39)
Since F (ht, kt, ht+1, kt+1, At) ≤ F (ht, kt, 0, 0, At) holds for the per-period return func-
tion, we know that:
F
[
pi1t-1(A
t-1), pi2t-1(A
t-1), pi1t (A
t), pi2t (A
t), At
]
≤ lnAt + (1−α+γ) lnpi
1
t-1(A
t-1) + α lnpi2t-1(A
t-1) (40)
must also hold. Hence for any triple (h0, k0, A0) and for any feasible plan pi, the sequence
of expected one period returns satisfies:
E0 [F (·, t)] < ρ
t lnA0 + α
(
ρt−αt
ρ−α
)
lnA0 +
(
t
1−α +
αt+1−α
(1−α)2
)
(1− α+ γ) lnB
(1−α+γ)(1−αt+1)
1−α lnh0 + α
t+1 ln k0,
where F (·, t) := F (kt, ht, kt+1, ht+1, At). Then for any feasible plan, the expected total
returns are bounded from above:
lim
n→∞
E0
[ n∑
t=0
βtF (·, t)
]
≤ β(1−α+γ) lnB
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
+ lnA0(1−ρβ)(1−αβ) +
(1−α+γ) lnh0
(1−αβ)(1−β) +
α ln k0
1−αβ .
We know from Section 3 that:
v(h, k,A) = θ + θh lnh+ θk ln k + θA lnA+ θB lnB (41)
is a solution to the functional equation. The coefficients θi, with i ∈ {h, k,A,B}, are
defined as follows:
θh :=
1−α+γ
(1−αβ)(1−β) , θk :=
α
1−αβ , θA :=
1
(1−ρβ)(1−αβ) , and θB :=
(1−α+γ)β
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
.
Indeed these coefficients imply that the function v(h, k,A) is below the upper bound.
The policy functions associated with v are given by:
ht+1 = B
(
β(1−α+γ)
1−α+βγ
)
ht, (42)
kt+1 = αβAtk
α
t h
1−α+γ
t
(
(1−α)(1−β)
1−α+βγ
)1−α
. (43)
Hence, given any initial state (h0, k0, A0), the plan pi
1∗[·, h0, k0, A0] generated by the first
policy rule can be calculated explicitly. Using this plan we can also calculate the second
plan pi2∗[·, h0, k0, A0]; in logs, they are:
lnpi1∗t-1[·, h0, k0, A0] = t lnB + t ln
β(1−α+γ)
1−α+βγ + lnh0,
lnpi2∗t-1[·, h0, k0, A0] =
t−1∑
i=0
αi
(
ln [αβ] + (1−α) ln
[
(1−α)(1−β)
1−α+βγ
]
+ (1− α+ γ) lnh0
)
+
t−1∑
i=0
αii (1− α+ γ)
(
ln
[
β(1−α+γ)
1−α+βγ
]
+ lnB
)
+ αt ln k0 +
t−1∑
i=0
αt-1-iAi.
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It only remains to be shown that conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 3 hold. In order to
verify that the plans pi1∗[·, h0, k0, A0] and pi
2∗[·, h0, k0, A0] satisfy (a), we have to show
that (37) holds for all (h0, k0, A0) when applying pi
1∗[·, h0, k0, A0] and pi
2∗[·, h0, k0, A0],
where v is given by (41). In our case we consider:
v
[
pi1∗t-1
(
At-1
)
, pi2∗t-1
(
At-1
)
, At
]
= θ + θB lnB + θh
(
t lnB + t ln β(1−α+γ)1−α+βγ + lnh0
)
+ θkα
t ln k0
+θk
t−1∑
i=0
αi
(
ln [αβ] + (1− α) ln
[
(1−α)(1−β)
1−α+βγ
]
+ (1− α+ γ) lnh0
)
+θk
t−1∑
i=0
αii (1− α+ γ)
(
ln
[
β(1−α+γ)
1−α+βγ
]
+ lnB
)
+ θk
t−1∑
i=0
αt-1-iAi + θA lnAt.
Using the fact that 0 < β < 1, 0 < αβ < 1, and E0 [lnAt] = ρ
t lnA0, it is straightforward
to show that condition (37) indeed holds.8
In order to verify condition (b), we need to show that for any initial state (h0, k0, A0)
in S, any plan in Π(h0, k0, A0) is weakly dominated by a plan in Πˆ(h0, k0, A0). Let
(h0, k0, A0) ∈ S and pi ∈ Π(h0, k0, A0) be arbitrary. By definition pi ∈ Πˆ(h0, k0, A0) if
and only if (37) holds. With v given by (41), the condition (37) reads as follows:
lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
θ + θh lnpi
1
t-1[A
t-1] + θk lnpi
2
t-1[A
t-1] + θA lnAt + θB lnB
]
= 0.
It follows from the assumptions on the At’s that:
lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
θA lnAt
]
= lim
t→∞
(ρβ)
t
θA lnA0 = 0.
Hence (37) holds if and only if:
lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
θh lnpi
1
t-1[A
t-1] + θk lnpi
2
t-1[A
t-1]
]
= 0. (44)
That is, pi ∈ Πˆ(h0, k0, A0) if and only if condition (44) holds. In addition, we know from
(38) and (39) that for all (ht, kt, At) and any pi ∈ Π(ht, kt, At) for all t ∈ N:
lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
lnpi1t-1[A
t-1]
]
≤ 0 and lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
lnpi2t-1[A
t-1]
]
≤ 0 (45)
must hold. Now suppose that pi /∈ Πˆ(h0, k0, A0), i.e. (44) fails to hold. It follows from
the inequality in (40) that:
u (pi, h0, k0, A0) ≤ E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnAt + (1−α+γ) lnpi
1
t-1[A
t-1] + α lnpi2t-1[A
t-1]
)]
.
Since (44) fails, the conditions in (45) imply that this series must diverge to minus infinity:
u (pi, h0, k0, A0) = −∞; in this case pi
1∗ and pi2∗ dominate pi1 and pi2. Thus condition
(b) is satisfied, and Theorem 3 applies. That is, v is indeed the value function and the
policy rules are given by (42) and (43). This ends the discussion of the centralized case.
In the next subsection we turn to the decentralized economy.
8Note, that for β ∈ (0, 1), limt→∞ tβt = 0 holds.
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A.3 The decentralized economy
We start the analysis of the decentralized case by rewriting the representative agent’s
optimization problem. In every period t the states At, kt, ht, and ha,t are given and next
period’s states kt+1 and ht+1 have to be chosen. The agent also knows the government’s
balanced budget restriction (36). This means that the agent’s earnings generated by
human and physical capital income can not exceed the economy’s per capita production.
Then the maximization problem is given by:
sup
{kt+1,ht+1}
∞
t=0
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βtF (kt, ht, kt+1, ht+1;At, ha,t)
]
,
such that
F (kt, ht, kt+1, ht+1;At, ha,t) = ln
[
Atk
α
t
(
ht −
ht+1
B
)1−α
hγa,t − kt+1
]
,
0 < ht+1 < Bht,
0 < kt+1 < Atk
α
t h
1−α
t h
γ
a,t,
0 < ha,t+1 < Bha,t,
lnAt+1 = ρ lnAt + εt+1,
ht = ha,t.
We have argued in Section 4 that the representative agent does not exploit the external
effect, because the market mechanism prevents agents from coordinating their actions.
However, the path of ha,t is predictable and the representative agent treats this path as
given.
Let (ht, kt) ∈ X = R
2
++ and (At, ha,t) ∈ Z = R
2
++ with the Borel sets X and Z.
9 Let
us now turn to the policy correspondence Γ, which is given by:
Γ (ht, kt;At, ha,t) =
{
(ht+1, kt+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ Atkαt
(
ht −
ht+1
B
)1−α
hγa,t − kt+1 ∈ R++;
kt+1, ht+1 > 0; ha,t = ht
}
for all t ≥ 0. The exogenous shocks are serially correlated with Et [lnAt+1] = ρ lnAt.
Again we want to verify that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold; find (v,G) and construct the
plan pi∗(·;x, z) all (x, z) ∈ S, and show that the two hypotheses (a) and (b) of Theorem
3 hold.
First, note that Assumption 1 holds: Γ(ht, kt;At, ha,t) is non-empty and there are
lots of measurable selections, for example:
h(ht, kt;At, ha,t) = (
1
2Bht,
1
2Atk
α
t h
1−α
t h
γ
a,t) ∈ Γ(ht, kt;At, ha,t).
In order to show that Assumption 2 holds, note first that the per-period return function
F
[
pi1t-1(z
t-1), pi2t-1(z
t-1), pi1t (z
t), pi2t (z
t), zt
]
is µt(z0, ·)-integrable and second that for any
(xt, zt) and any pi ∈ Π(xt, zt) for all t ∈ N:
lnpi1t-1(z
t-1) < t lnB + lnh0,
lnpi2t-1(z
t-1) <
t−1∑
i=0
αi
{
lnAt-1-i + (1− α) lnpi
1
t-2-i(z
t-2-i) + γ lnha,t-1-i
}
+ αt ln k0
9Note that this Borel set differs from that in the previous section.
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hold. Using the first inequality, we may further simplify the second and finally arrive at
the following condition:10
lnpi2t-1(z
t-1) <
t−1∑
i=0
αi lnAt-1-i +
(
t
1−α +
αt−1
(1−α)2
)
(1− α+ γ) lnB
+ γ1−α (1− α
t) lnha,0 + (1− α
t) lnh0 + α
t ln k0.
Applying the expectations operator with respect to the information set available in period
0 to all At-1-i gives:
E0
[
lnpi2t-1(z
t-1)
]
< ρ
t−αt
ρ−α lnA0 +
γ
1−α (1− α
t) lnh0 + (1− α
t) lnh0
+
(
t
1−α +
αt−1
(1−α)2
)
(1− α+ γ) lnB + αt ln k0.
Since F (ht, kt, ht+1, kt+1, At;ha,t) ≤ F (ht, kt, 0, 0, At;ha,t) holds for the per-period re-
turn function we know that:
F
[
pi1t-1(z
t-1), pi2t-1(z
t-1), pi1t (z
t), pi2t (z
t), zt
]
≤ lnAt + γ lnha,t + (1− α) lnpi
1
t-1(z
t-1) + α lnpi2t-1(z
t-1) (46)
must also hold. Hence for any pair (h0, k0, A0) and for any feasible plan pi, the sequence
of expected one period returns satisfies:
E0 [F (·, t)] < ρ
t lnA0 + α
(
ρt−αt
ρ−α
)
lnA0 +
(
t
1−α +
αt+1−α
(1−α)2
)
(1− α+ γ) lnB
(1−α+γ)(1−αt+1)
1−α lnh0 + α
t+1 ln k0,
where F (·, t) := F (kt, ht, kt+1, ht+1, At). Then for any feasible plan, the expected total
returns are bounded from above:
lim
n→∞
E0
[ n∑
t=0
βtF (·, t)
]
≤ α ln k01−αβ +
(1−α) lnh0
(1−αβ)(1−β) +
γ lnha,0
(1−αβ)(1−β) +
β(1−α+γ) lnB
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
+ lnA0(1−ρβ)(1−αβ)
This concludes our search for an upper bound of the value function, i.e. we have shown
that the limit in Assumption 2 exists although it may be minus infinity.
We know from Section 4 that:
v(h, k,A) = ϕ+ ϕk ln k + ϕh lnh+ ϕha lnha + ϕA lnA+ ϕB lnB (47)
solves the functional equation. The coefficients ϕi, with i ∈ {k, h, ha, A,B}, were defined
as follows11:
ϕk :=
α
1−αβ , ϕh :=
1−α
(1−β)(1−αβ) , ϕha :=
γ
(1−β)(1−αβ) ,
ϕB :=
(1−α+γ)β
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
, ϕA :=
1
(1−ρβ)(1−αβ) .
10Note that
Pt
s=0 sα
s = α 1−α
t
(1−α)2
−
αt+1t
1−α
holds.
11The constant ϕ is given by: ϕ :=
ln[1−αβ]
1−β
+
(1−α) ln[1−β]
(1−β)(1−αβ)
+ αβ lnα
(1−β)(1−αβ)
+
(1−αβ+γ)β ln β
(1−β)2(1−αβ)
.
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Indeed these coefficients imply that the function v(h, k,A) is below the upper bound.
The policy functions associated with v are given by:
ht+1 = B
β
β+τw(1−β)
ht, (48)
kt+1 = αβAtk
α
t h
1−α+γ
t
(
τw(1−β)
β+τw(1−β)
)1−α
. (49)
Hence, given any initial state s0 = (k0, h0, ha,0, A0), the plan pi
1∗[·, s0] generated by the
first policy rule can be calculated explicitly. Using this plan we also can calculate the
second plan pi2∗[·, s0]; in logs, they are:
lnpi1∗t-1[·, s0] = t lnB + t ln
[
β
β+τw(1−β)
]
+ lnh0,
lnpi2∗t-1[·, s0] =
t−1∑
i=0
αi
(
ln [αβ] + (1− α) ln
[
τw(1−β)
β+τw(1−β)
]
+ (1− α) lnh0 + γ lnha,0
)
+
t−1∑
i=0
αii(1− α+ γ)
(
ln
[
β
β+τw(1−β)
]
+ lnB
)
+ αt ln k0 +
t−1∑
i=0
αt-1-iAi.
It remains only to be shown that conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 3 hold. In order
to verify that the plans pi1∗[·, s0] and pi
2∗[·, s0] satisfy condition (a), we have to show that
(37) holds for all (s0) when applying pi
1∗[·, s0] and pi
2∗[·, s0], where v is given by (47). In
our case we consider:
v
[
pi1∗t-1
(
At-1, ht-1a
)
, pi2∗t-1
(
At-1, ht-1a
)
, At, ha,t
]
= ϕ+ ϕB lnB + (ϕh + ϕha)
(
t lnB + t ln
[
β
β+τw(1−β)
])
+ ϕh lnh0 + ϕha lnha,0
+ϕkα
t ln k0+ϕk
t−1∑
i=0
αi
(
ln[αβ]+(1−α) ln
[
τw(1−β)
β+τw(1−β)
]
+(1−α) lnh0+γ lnha,0
)
+ϕk
t−1∑
i=0
αii (1− α+ γ)
(
ln
[
β
β+τw(1−β)
]
+ lnB
)
+ ϕk
t−1∑
i=0
αt-1-iAi + ϕA lnAt.
Using the fact that 0 < β < 1, 0 < αβ < 1, and E0 [lnAt] = ρ
t lnA0, it is straightforward
to show that condition (37) indeed holds12.
In order to verify condition (b) we need to show that for any initial state (s0) ∈ S,
any plan in Π(s0) is weakly dominated by a plan in Πˆ(s0). Let (s0) ∈ S and pi ∈ Π(s0)
be arbitrary. By definition pi ∈ Πˆ(s0) if and only if (37) holds. With v given by (47),
condition (37) reads as follows:
lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
ϕ′+ ϕA lnAt + ϕha lnhat+ ϕh lnpi
1
t-1[A
t-1,ht-1a ]+ ϕk lnpi
2
t-1[A
t-1,ht-1a ]
]
=0,
where ϕ′ := ϕ+ ϕB lnB. It follows from the assumptions on the At’s that
lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
ϕA lnAt
]
= lim
t→∞
(ρβ)
t
ϕA lnA0 = 0.
Furthermore, note that the path of lnha,t is bounded by t lnB+lnha,0. Hence condition
(37) holds if and only if:
lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
ϕh lnpi
1
t-1[A
t-1] + ϕk lnpi
2
t-1[A
t-1]
]
= 0. (50)
12Note, that for β ∈ (0, 1) limt→∞ tβt = 0 holds.
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That is, pi ∈ Πˆ(s0) if and only if condition (50) holds. In addition, we know from (38)
and (39) that for all st and any pi ∈ Π(st) for all t ∈ N
lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
lnpi1t-1[A
t-1, ht-1a ]
]
≤ 0 and lim
t→∞
βtE0
[
lnpi2t-1[A
t-1, ht-1a ]
]
≤ 0 (51)
must hold. Now suppose that pi /∈ Πˆ(s0), i.e. (44) fails. It follows from the inequality in
(46) that
u (pi, h0, k0, A0) ≤ E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnAt + (1− α+ γ) lnpi
1
t-1[A
t-1] + α lnpi2t-1[A
t-1]
)]
.
Since (44) fails, the conditions in (45) imply that this series must diverge to minus infinity:
u (pi, h0, k0, A0) = −∞; in this case pi
1∗ and pi2∗ dominate pi1 and pi2. Thus condition
(b) is satisfied, and Theorem 3 applies. That is, v is indeed the value function and the
policy rules are given by (48) and (49).
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